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Your Local Solar Panel Store: Developing State 
Laws To Encourage Third-Party Power Purchase 
Agreements and Distributed Generation 
Sam D. Bolstad* 
On April 12, 2012, the Iowa Utilities Board told Barry 
Shear, President of Eagle Point Solar,1 that Eagle Point would 
be operating as an unlicensed public utility if it sold the elec-
tricity generated by solar panels it installed on City of Dubuque 
buildings to the city.2 Mr. Shear and his company were there-
fore prohibited from doing so.3 The Board based its decision on 
the fact that the utility company Interstate Power and Light 
had exclusive electric utility service rights in that territory.4 
Eagle Point petitioned for judicial review, and the Iowa District 
Court for Polk County reversed the Board’s ruling, reasoning 
that Eagle Point Solar was simply providing a form of energy 
efficiency by reducing the City of Dubuque’s demand for pur-
chasing electricity from the utility company.5 The case went to 
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for her insight and guidance on the drafting process and the complexities of 
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thanks to the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, who have been a 
wonderful community of colleagues and friends. My utmost gratitude and love 
to my family, Paul, Sheryl, Holly, and Brittany, for their love and support. 
Copyright © 2014 by Sam D. Bolstad. 
 1. Our Staff, EAGLE POINT SOLAR, http://www.eaglepointsolar.com/about 
-us/staff.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 2. See SZ Enters., LLC, Docket No. DRU-2012-0001, at 17 (State of Iowa 
Dep’t of Commerce Utils. Bd. Apr. 12, 2012) (declaratory ruling), 
https://efs.iowa.gov/cs/groups/external/documents/docket/mdaw/mtmy/~edisp/ 
101261.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., Case No. CVCV009166, at 14, 24 
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County Mar. 29, 2013), http://www 
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the Iowa Supreme Court, which agreed with the district court 
and held that Eagle Point could sell the City the electricity 
generated from the solar panels.6 The entire process took more 
than two years to litigate. 
Solar panel companies around much of the United States 
face the same legal uncertainty that Eagle Point Solar con-
fronted over the past several years. Much of energy regulation 
has been left to the states, and in over half of them it remains 
unclear whether solar panel companies can sell electricity un-
der the same model as Eagle Point Solar, known as a third-
party power purchase agreement (PPA).7 Under the third-party 
PPA model, interested consumers, whether they be residential 
homeowners, businesses, or municipalities, do not bear the 
burden of the steep upfront capital costs associated with pur-
chasing and installing solar panel facilities; instead, the solar 
panel company shoulders this cost when it installs the solar 
panel facility on-site at the consumer’s location.8 The solar pan-
el company then recoups the money by selling the electricity 
produced by the panels to the consumer.9 
Because the consumer’s demand for electricity is met by 
the solar panel company, this takes business away from electric 
utilities, which in many states have exclusive jurisdiction over 
a given service territory. In those states that have not legislat-
ed on third-party PPAs, solar panel companies face legal uncer-
tainty as to whether they are operating as an unlicensed elec-
tric utility in violation of a state’s laws or regulations.10 In 
Midwest states in particular, policies that grant utilities a mo-
nopoly on providing electricity to a certain area have signifi-
cantly limited the opportunity for a solar-construction boom by 
failing to recognize and facilitate the third-party PPA model.11 
 
.midwestenergynews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/iowa-solar-ruling.pdf 
[hereinafter SZ Enters. Dist. Ct.]. 
 6. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 13-0642, 2014 WL 3377074, at 
*1 (Iowa July 11, 2014, as corrected Aug. 14, 2014). 
 7. See 3rd-Party Solar PV Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), DATA-
BASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/3rd_Party_PPA_map.pdf. 
 8. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/solarpower.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, at 14–15. 
 11. Ryan Tracy, Solar Energy Spurs a Power Struggle, WALL ST. J. (June 
23, 2013, 9:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324069104578527682342015380. 
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Meanwhile, states like California, Arizona, and New Jersey—
which allow solar panel companies to sell their electricity 
through third-party PPA agreements—have seen just that 
boom.12 These inconsistencies between states create market in-
efficiencies, because they discourage solar panel companies 
from expanding into states where they simply do not know 
whether they can operate.13 These inconsistencies also stunt the 
development of a better clean energy system and prevent the 
United States from maximizing its energy potential.14 
This Note proposes a model law to delineate how solar 
panel companies can sell electricity from panels installed on a 
customer’s property and argues that states should enact this 
law to realize their energy and economic potential. Part I of 
this Note examines the basis for modern utility regulation, de-
scribes the ways in which the market has changed, and then 
outlines the third-party PPA model. Part II exposes the prob-
lems with the status quo, analyzes how the third-party PPA 
model mitigates the status quo’s problems, and then evaluates 
how states have responded with laws and regulations allowing 
solar panel companies to operate in this manner. Part III ad-
dresses potential solutions, starting with a baseline proposal 
that state governments should facilitate the installation of so-
 
 12. Id.; Jeff McMahon, Four Ways the Solar Boom Has Rattled Utilities, 
FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/ 
2013/09/23/four-ways-the-solar-boom-has-rattled-utilities. 
 13. Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
Policy and Regulatory Environment, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/eere/ 
sunshot/policy-and-regulatory-environment (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (noting 
that “key barriers to solar market development” include “[r]estrictive inter-
connection and net metering rules,” “[r]egulatory uncertainty,” and “siting re-
strictions in local codes, ordinances, and covenants”); cf. JOSEPH WIEDMAN ET 
AL., FREEING THE GRID 2012: BEST PRACTICES IN STATE NET METERING POLI-
CIES AND INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES 9 (2012), available at http:// 
freeingthegrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FTG2012.pdf (noting that “in-
consistency is the enemy of clean energy development” because it “undermines 
the ability of businesses to operate efficiently across utility service territories 
or state lines, and increases costs to all program participants—utilities, con-
sumers, businesses and commission staff—by forcing these stakeholders to 
master the idiosyncrasies of each individual state’s programs”). 
 14. See WIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 13. Nevertheless, solar energy was 
the fastest growing industry in the United States in 2010, and this arguably 
emphasizes the untapped potential that has yet to be drawn on in half of the 
country. Chris Meehan, Solar Is U.S.’s Fastest Growing Industry Says SEIA 
CEO, CLEANENERGYAUTHORITY.COM (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www 
.cleanenergyauthority.com/solar-energy-news/solar-is-fastest-growing 
-industry-in-country-040511. 
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lar panels on the “demand side”15 of the electricity market. This 
change fits within the current model for regulating the energy 
industry, and much of the rest of the energy system can remain 
the same; for example, a regulated public utility providing tra-
ditional retail electric services will still be necessary.16 The pro-
posed model law allows solar panel companies to operate in a 
way that fosters healthy competition between all methods of 
electricity generation and distribution. 
I.  MODERN UTILITY REGULATION   
Modern energy law as we know it has only been around 
since the mid-1970s, but its laws are based on fundamental as-
sumptions that have their roots in policies from much earlier.17 
Those assumptions have not only provided the basis for gov-
ernment regulation of the electricity market, but have also 
shaped that regulation as it has developed over time. Part I of 
this Note explains the justifications for modern utility regula-
tion, then examines how the electricity market actually func-
tions. It then looks at how the electricity market has changed 
since modern regulation was first enacted. Finally, this Part 
provides an outline of the third-party PPA model, which was 
developed by solar panel companies to work within the existing 
electricity market framework. 
 
 15. This Note distinguishes between activities that occur on the “demand 
side” and the “supply side” of the electricity market. This divide occurs at each 
consumer’s electricity meter. The meter measures the consumer’s demand for 
electricity and assists in the coordination of utilities’ consequent transmission 
of electricity to the consumer; these activities occur on the “supply side” of the 
market. See W.M. WARWICK, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE 
ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGU-
LATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 1.1, 4.9, 5.7 
(2002), available at http://eere.pnnl.gov/femp/publications/Primer 
-ElectricUtilitiesDeregulationRestructuring.pdf. The term “demand side” re-
fers to electricity generation sources that are connected directly to a consum-
er’s property, such as solar panels on a consumer’s rooftop. See id. at A.10. 
 16. While beyond the scope of this Note, altering the generation stage of 
the energy industry also presents an opportunity to reimagine our power grid. 
Former Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson has said that “[r]egulated monop-
oly utilities . . . have left the U.S. with a ‘third world power grid’ and . . . that 
deregulated electricity markets can work.” See Interview, Bill Richardson, 
PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/ 
interviews/richardson.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (describing an interview 
with Bill Richardson on April 10, 2001). 
 17. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Poli-
cy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 356–69 (1990). For a survey of the development of 
U.S. energy policy, see JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 65–106 (2d ed. 2011). 
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A. POLICY RATIONALES FOR MODERN UTILITY REGULATION 
In most jurisdictions, electricity production is regulated as 
a natural monopoly, although this is not true in all jurisdic-
tions.18 The justifications for monopolized electricity production 
rest on a bedrock premise: a single, regulated entity that gen-
erates, transmits, and distributes electricity can provide these 
services for less, because a competitive market would lead to 
wastefully duplicative infrastructures.19 Essentially, eliminat-
ing competition will eliminate the duplicative costs of multiple 
generation, transmission, and distribution systems that provide 
the same services to consumers in the same general location.20 
Consequently, regulated service will ensure dependable electri-
cal service at a reasonable price, particularly in remote areas 
that would not receive the same attention in a competitive 
market.21 
Therefore, the historical conception of a utility involves in-
tegration of the three functions of electricity generation, 
transmission, and distribution.22 Historically, each of these 
 
 18. There are currently thirty-three states that regulate the electricity 
industry by imposing exclusive service areas for electric utilities. See AM. PUB. 
POWER ASS’N, RETAIL ELECTRIC RATES IN DEREGULATED AND REGULATED 
STATES: 2012 UPDATE 2 (2013); The Only Correct Deregulated States Map, EN-
ERGY TARIFF EXPERTS (May 29, 2013), http://energytariffexperts.com/blog/ 
2013/5/29/the-only-correct-deregulated-states-map. 
 19. See KATHARINE KOLLINS ET AL., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & 
RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/TP-6A2-46723, SOLAR PV 
PROJECT FINANCING: REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THIRD-
PARTY PPA SYSTEM OWNERS 4 (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy10osti/46723.pdf (“Retail electricity markets in the United States re-
main regulated in most states in part to protect consumers (rates and reliabil-
ity) and to ensure a highly functioning electric grid. . . . [R]egulation of these 
markets prevents unnecessary duplication of assets such as transmission and 
distribution facilities.”); THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY 
REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 3–4 (2011), available at http://www 
.raponline.org/document/download/id/645; WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.1. 
 20. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.1 (citing the “high cost of distribution 
infrastructure” as a justification for monopolized utility services); Severin 
Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation or 
Reregulation?, 23 REG.: CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T, no. 2, 2000, at 47 (“In the 
transmission and distribution sectors, effective competition would require that 
rival firms duplicate one another’s wire networks, which would be ineffi-
cient.”). 
 21. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.1 (noting that “the government has 
granted individual utilities certain monopoly rights” in order “[t]o prevent 
price gouging and encourage widespread access”). 
 22. Id. at 2.2; Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 20, at 46 (“Analysis of 
the electricity industry begins with the recognition that there are three rather 
distinct components of it: generation, transmission, and distribution. . . . In 
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three functions was considered a natural monopoly, warranting 
government regulation to minimize steep start-up costs and 
duplicative waste while ensuring reasonable prices for consum-
ers.23 The electric utility, as a regulated monopoly, would gen-
erate electricity at a power plant, transmit the electricity from 
the power plant along a transmission line, and then distribute 
the electricity to individual homes and office buildings.24 
Electric utilities operating as monopolies across these three 
functions are given exclusive service areas within which they 
provide electricity free from competition.25 In exchange for this 
monopoly, the utility sells at a rate determined by the regulat-
ing entity, generally a state public utility commission or public 
 
the United States, all three of these vertically related sectors have typically 
been tied together within a utility.”). 
 23. Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 20, at 46–47 (noting that “each sec-
tor was thought of as a natural monopoly”—transmission and distribution be-
cause of duplicative services and generation “because of the large scale of effi-
cient generation plants and the losses that occurred with long-distance 
transmission, which made it more efficient to have local areas served by one or 
a small number of generating plants”). 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)—
although it dealt with grain elevators—established the first major principle in 
energy law regarding natural monopolies: industries exhibiting the market 
behavior of a natural monopoly should be regulated by the states so as to pre-
vent price gouging. Id. at 127–33. 
More recently, however, the federal government and certain states have 
restructured the model to eliminate certain monopoly statuses. THE REGULA-
TORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 8. At the federal level, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has allowed wholesale electricity 
sales to occur at market-based rates rather than being pegged to cost-of-
service rates, as long as the seller is in a sufficiently competitive market. See 
G. William Stafford, Electric Wholesale Power Sales at Market-Based Rates, 12 
ENERGY L.J. 291, 291 (1991). Additionally, several states have deregulated to 
allow their consumers to choose between competing power suppliers, which in 
turn means that these consumers only pay their utility company for its distri-
bution service. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 14. 
This state-level deregulation meant that many utilities that had previously 
owned their own generation sources sold off those power plants. Id. See gener-
ally WARWICK, supra note 15, at 6.1–7.2 (discussing the causes of deregula-
tion, the current state of deregulation, and how the market has adapted to 
these changes); infra Part I.B.3 (discussing how some states have attempted to 
encourage retail competition through deregulation). 
 24. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.2 (“The popular image of a utility is a 
company that has its own generation, transmission, and distribution and ex-
ists as somewhat of an island among similarly situated adjacent utilities.”). 
 25. Id. at 2.1 (“Generally, an energy utility is provided an exclusive right 
to sell energy to retail customers in a specifically defined area, called the ser-
vice area or franchise territory.”). 
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service commission.26 These rates are conventionally set based 
on the utility’s costs, particularly capital investments and op-
erating expenses, plus an additional amount to attract inves-
tors who can provide capital at favorable interest rates.27 His-
torically, the conception was that the capital investments and 
operating expenses of the three functions could be bundled into 
one rate that could cover all costs when selling electricity to the 
end consumer.28 Ultimately, this regulatory model envisions 
large-scale, capital-intensive, centralized energy production 
and distribution by a single entity, for which the consumer 
pays a rate that covers all the costs involved in the entire pro-
cess, plus a reasonable return on the utility’s investments.29 
B. HOW THE ELECTRICITY MARKET ACTUALLY FUNCTIONS 
In reality, almost no electric utility performs all three func-
tions in a perfect bundle.30 Instead, utilities produce some elec-
tricity themselves, and purchase additional electricity from en-
tities whose primary function is to generate power for resale. 
This use of an interconnected network of generating plants, 
transmission lines, and distribution facilities requires coordi-
nated, cooperative action from the interacting entities. 
1. Electricity Generation Is a Competitive Market 
While transmission and distribution continue to exhibit 
characteristics of natural monopolies,31 generation has devel-
 
 26. Id. at 5.1 (“In the United States, state [Public Utilities Commissions] 
regulate retail electricity prices while FERC regulates wholesale prices.”). 
 27. Id. at 5.2. The rate formula is explained in TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra 
note 17, at 182–83, as follows: 
  R = O + (V – D)r 
  The variables in this formula are defined as: 
  R   The utility’s total revenue requirement or rate level. This is the 
total amount of money a regulator allows a utility to earn. 
  O   The utility’s operating expenses. 
  V   The gross value of the utility’s tangible and intangible property. 
  D   The utility’s accrued depreciation. Combined (V – D) constitute the 
utility’s “rate base,” also known as its capital investment. 
  r    The rate of return a utility is allowed to earn on its capital invest-
ment or on its rate base. 
 28. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 169–92.  
 29. Id. at 104, 180–92. 
 30. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.2 (“The fact is that only a small fraction 
of the 3,200 or so electric utilities perform all three functions and virtually no 
utility exists in isolation.”). 
 31. See Tomain, supra note 17, at 387. 
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oped into a competitive market; electric utilities have opted to 
purchase electricity—from firms that only generate electricity 
but do not necessarily transmit or distribute it—and re-sell it to 
the end consumer.32 This phenomenon began due to section 210 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which al-
lows independent electricity producers to access the power grid 
and sell their electricity.33 This provision effectively separates 
the generation function from the perfectly vertically integrated 
utility, allowing businesses to participate in the wholesale gen-
eration market without building their own transmission and 
distribution lines. Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) further facilitated this separation with the 
Energy Policy Act of 199234 and FERC’s Order 888 in 1996,35 
which allow generation-only firms, known as non-utility gener-
ators (NUGs), to have open and nondiscriminatory access to 
utilities’ transmission lines. Consequently, generation competi-
tion has increased as new electricity suppliers have entered the 
market.36 NUGs are now significant players in the wholesale 
generation market, and account for thirty-four percent of all 
electricity generated in the United States.37 
A wide variety of energy resources make up the electricity 
generation market, each of which has different generation 
 
 32. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 2.2 (“[V]ery few [electric utilities] own 
enough generating resources to meet all of their needs. . . . As a result, the 
vast majority of utilities rely on power purchases from others. Purchased pow-
er is transmitted, or wheeled, from remote generators across the transmission 
grid to local utility substations connected to distribution lines that serve end 
user loads.”); Id. at 2.3 fig.2.1 (“In reality, even in a regulated environment, 
most utilities buy power from generation and transmission utilities.”); Id. at 
3.4 (“[N]ot all utilities build, own, or operate their own generation.”). 
 33. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 
§ 210, 92 Stat. 3117, 3144–47. 
 34. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, tit. VII, 106 Stat. 
2776, 2905–21. 
 35. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Strand-
ed Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 
12,275 (Mar. 14, 1997) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 36. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 364 (“[O]ver the last two dec-
ades, there has been an increase in the number of firms that generate electric-
ity but do not own or operate transmission facilities.”); EDISON ELEC. INST., 
KEY FACTS ABOUT THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 4–5 (2007), available at 
http://www.cewd.org/toolkits/teacher/eeipub_keyfacts_electric_industry.pdf 
(noting that there are “many new electricity suppliers that have emerged as 
competition advances and that are vying to compete in wholesale and retail 
electricity markets”). 
 37. See EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 36, at 5. 
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costs. These include fossil fuel sources such as coal, natural 
gas, and oil; nuclear energy; and renewable energy sources 
such as wind, solar, hydropower, and geothermal energy.38 This 
variety in generation methods and costs creates a scaling model 
of energy generation that is dependent upon marginal cost of 
production and fluctuating demand levels. Once the generation 
facilities have been built, capital investments become sunk 
costs.39 Therefore, power is generated and/or purchased for re-
sale based on which generation method has the lowest margin-
al cost of production at the current demand level; this model is 
known as “merit order.”40 As demand for electricity fluctuates 
across the hours of the day and the months of the year, addi-
tional power sources are dispatched as the cheapest sources 
reach maximum cost-efficient generation; low-cost plants are 
sufficient when demand is low, while almost all generation 
sources are drawn upon during peak demand.41 
2. The Competitive Market Facilitates Coordinated Action To 
Monitor Consumer Demand 
Because the electric utilities are no longer always vertical-
ly integrated entities that perform all three functions in isola-
tion from other electric utilities, the players in the electricity 
market must coordinate with each other to meet consumer de-
mand.42 
 
 38. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0035(2013/09), SEPTEMBER 
2013 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 95 (2013). 
 39. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 3.5. 
 40. Id. (“[P]lant operating decisions (which plants to run and how long) 
are made based on variable costs, which are dominated by fuel costs. These 
controllable costs are referred to as production costs. Plants are generally dis-
patched (started and run) to serve loads based on production costs . . . . That 
way the least expensive plants run the most, minimizing production costs and, 
thus, minimizing total electricity costs.”); see also EDISON ELEC. INST., supra 
note 36, at 30 (“Electric companies schedule the operation of their generating 
units to meet . . . changing patterns of use, with more expensive units operat-
ing only at times of high demand.”). 
In states where renewable portfolio standards have been established, gen-
eration is also guided by a utility’s need to meet these standards. See 
WARWICK, supra note 15, at 5.9. 
 41. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 3.5 (“Variations in energy demand result 
in different combinations of power plants, and therefore, different production 
costs. When demand is low, only low-cost plants operate. When demand is 
high, such as during summer or winter peaks, almost all available generation 
is needed and, therefore, production costs are high.”). 
 42. EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 36, at 19; THE REGULATORY ASSIS-
TANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 16–18. This coordination formally exists 
through regional transmission organizations and independent system opera-
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Coordination might not be necessary except for electricity’s 
unique and fundamental property that it cannot be stored for 
later use.43 Instead, electricity must be produced when the con-
sumer needs it.44 Therefore, the electric load that all generators 
supply across the country must equal the sum of demand from 
all consumers across the country.45 
This coordination requires monitoring of several factors: (1) 
the amount of electricity demanded by consumers; (2) the 
amount of electricity flowing over the transmission system from 
the electric utility’s own generators; and (3) the amount of elec-
tricity flowing over the transmission system purchased from 
other entities’ generators.46 
3. Some States Have Opted To Encourage Retail Competition 
Through Deregulation 
While the federal government is responsible for regulating 
energy generation in the wholesale market, each state is re-
sponsible for establishing its own retail market for electricity 
 
tors, which “plan, operate, dispatch, and provide open-access transmission 
service.” Id. at 17. There is also the North American Electric Reliability Coun-
cil, which is responsible for reliability planning to ensure dependable delivery 
of electricity across the country. See id. at 16. 
 43. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 16. Batter-
ies are the conventional method for storing electricity once it has been pro-
cessed from raw materials, but they remain inefficient and are expensive for 
storing electricity in large quantities. See Paul Tullis, Want To Revolutionize 
Energy? Improve the Battery, SMITHSONIAN.COM (May 22, 2013), http://www 
.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Want-to-Revolutionize 
-Energy-Improve-the-Battery-208379831.html (discussing batteries’ difficul-
ties in compactly storing large quantities of energy and noting that improve-
ments in one area often lead to deficiencies in another); see also David Lindley, 
Smart Grids: The Energy Storage Problem, 463 NATURE 18, 18 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100106/pdf/463018a.pdf (“[E]lectrical 
energy is difficult and expensive to store in large quantities.”). 
 44. EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 36, at 19. 
 45. In reality, there are three separate grids in the United States, each of 
which hosts several regional power markets; each of these three grids per-
forms the above-described task of matching supply to demand. LINCOLN L. 
DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 303 (West Academic Publishing 
2014). Additionally, due to the fluctuations in consumer demand, the potential 
for unexpected increases in demand, and the potential for plant failures, regu-
lators actually require utilities to maintain a reserve margin, typically set be-
tween fifteen to twenty percent above actual demand. WARWICK, supra note 
15, at 3.8. 
 46. See EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 36, at 20. 
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sales.47 In recognition of the changing dynamics at the whole-
sale generation stage, some states have taken the federal re-
quirement—of open, nondiscriminatory access to transmission 
lines for NUGs—to heart by allowing retail customers to pur-
chase electricity from any supplier on the grid.48 This deregula-
tion removes old requirements that customers purchase elec-
tricity from their local utility. In total, seventeen states and the 
District of Columbia have deregulated to varying degrees.49 
Deregulation requires a new model with changes at the 
various stages in the electricity industry. States have to en-
large their markets beyond individual utility service areas in 
order to dilute the power of incumbent providers in each locali-
ty.50 Concurrent with an expanded market, states generally re-
quire electric utilities to divest themselves of their generation 
facilities in their local markets.51 Divestiture limits the genera-
tion capabilities of incumbent utilities—which previously dom-
inated the market in their monopolized territory—thereby in-
viting competitors into that market.52 Finally, generation 
competition requires open access to transmission lines to the 
extent that the transmission lines can bear the electric load.53 
In summary, energy law continues to be a patchwork of 
rules and regulations across the country, mixing state and fed-
eral law. The monopoly utility is no longer a perfectly vertically 
integrated entity. Instead, there is competition in the wholesale 
generation market across the country and at the retail level in 
many states. But in the majority of states, there remains no 
 
 47. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 45, at 311 (“The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) regulates interstate wholesale electricity sales. State 
public utility commissions (PUCs) regulate the retail market.”). 
 48. EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 36, at 28–29. Several additional fac-
tors spurred the trend towards deregulation, namely that (a) there was a 
broader societal shift towards deregulation and market restructuring, (b) rate 
increases pushed politicians to consider electricity competition, and (c) con-
sumers were increasingly demanding clean energy. See DAVIES ET AL., supra 
note 45, at 393. 
 49. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, supra note 18, at 2; The Only Correct Deregu-
lated States Map, supra note 18 (designating states blue, green, or purple to 
denote electricity deregulation); Explore Energy Rates in District of Columbia, 
SAVE ON ENERGY, https://www.saveonenergy.com/District-of-Columbia/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 50. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 6.7. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 17. 
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competition at the retail level, which poses barriers to solar 
providers in those states. 
C. OUTLINING THE THIRD-PARTY POWER PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT 
With the development of NUGs and the dissipation of the 
perfectly vertically integrated electric utility monopoly, there is 
room for solar panel companies to operate within the electricity 
industry on a larger scale. Solar panel companies share a num-
ber of similarities with NUGs, but there are also differences 
that distinguish the way a solar panel company can best pro-
vide electricity to customers. Upfront capital costs are the most 
significant hurdle to constructing solar power facilities,54 much 
like conventional power plants. Unlike conventional power 
plants though, there are minimal continuing costs after con-
struction, since solar facilities do not have fuel needs, require 
minimal maintenance, and do not require on-site employees to 
run the facility.55 
In order to overcome the hurdle of significant upfront capi-
tal costs—and encourage purchases by individual consumers—
solar panel companies use a contract called a third-party power 
purchase agreement (PPA).56 If a homeowner or a business 
wants to install solar panels on its rooftop, or a town wants to 
install solar panels on its city hall, schools, or any other munic-
ipal building, they typically do so through a PPA.57 
 
 54. Chris Nelder, Financial Innovation Is the Next Big Thing in Clean En-
ergy and Efficiency, SMARTPLANET (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.smartplanet 
.com/blog/the-take/financial-innovation-is-the-next-big-thing-in-clean-energy 
-and-efficiency (acknowledging that “solar systems . . . are hard to finance” 
and that “coming up with the initial capital can be too high a hurdle”); Robert 
Peltier, High Capital Costs Plague Solar (RPS Mandates, Cost Dilution via 
Energy Mixing Required) Part III, MASTERRESOURCE (Nov. 19, 2009), 
https://www.masterresource.org/solar-power/high-capital-costs-plague-solar 
-rps-mandates-cost-dilution-via-energy-mixing-required-part-iii (noting the 
“enormous . . . capital cost considerations of [photovoltaic] projects”). 
 55. See Nelder, supra note 54 (“[T]he only real risk to continued cash flow 
is weather.”). 
 56. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, supra note 8 (noting that PPAs 
“enable the host customer to avoid many of the traditional barriers to adoption 
for organizations looking to install solar systems” including “high up-front cap-
ital costs”). 
 57. See, e.g., Joyce Lobeck, Solar Zone: More Schools, Business Become 
Generating Plants, YUMA SUN (Oct. 19, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www 
.yumasun.com/solar-zone-more-schools-business-become-generating-plants/ 
article_e3bcacfc-0e0d-5943-9ee8-59cbe71f6972.html (observing that “solar pro-
jects are popping up all over the community at businesses, schools and even 
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In a brief overview of the third-party PPA model, the most 
important characteristic is that the solar panel company bears 
the upfront costs for the production and installation of the solar 
panel facility, and consequently obtains certain federal tax 
credits for these activities.58 Such cost allocation provides the 
consumer the benefits of solar power without immediately bear-
ing the costs of constructing the solar panel facility, thereby en-
couraging greater adoption of solar power.59 The solar panel 
company often partners with an outside investor, and—when 
selling to towns and municipalities—can raise additional capi-
tal with municipal bonds.60 These fundraising steps are central 
to the ingenuity of the third-party PPA model: municipalities 
do not pay taxes, and therefore have no use for federal tax cred-
its; solar panel companies, however, are private, tax-paying 
businesses, and are able to use these tax credits to offset their 
costs or, alternatively, the tax credits can be sold to an investor 
in exchange for additional upfront capital.61 With sufficient cap-
ital, the solar panel company builds the facility, usually on the 
consumer’s rooftop or in a nearby open area, and continues to 
perform any necessary maintenance on the facility over the 
 
Yuma City Hall” and that “most customers enter into a power purchase 
agreement with a third party that would fund the upfront cost”). 
 58. For a full explanation of the third-party PPA model, see Solar Power 
Purchase Agreement Graphic, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www 
.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/sppa.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 59. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, supra note 8. 
 60. Third-party PPA financing is a creative venture that involves attract-
ing investors who are interested in the renewable energy certificates that the 
solar panel facilities generate, taking advantage of accelerated depreciation, 
and using investment tax credits to offset other aspects of the investors’ own 
balance sheets. KARLYNN CORY ET AL., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RE-
NEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/TP-670-43115, SOLAR PHO-
TOVOLTAIC FINANCING: DEPLOYMENT ON PUBLIC PROPERTY BY STATE AND LO-
CAL GOVERNMENTS vi, 4–8, 21–24 (2008), available at http://www.nrel. 
gov/docs/fy08osti/43115.pdf; KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 19, 40–41. This 
financing method is developing into an established market that some deem 
reliable enough to warrant favorable bond ratings. Diane Cardwell, Bonds 
Backed by Solar Power Payments Get Nod, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/business/energy-environment/bonds 
-backed-by-solar-power-payments-get-nod.html. See generally Samantha 
Jacoby, Comment, Solar-Backed Securities: Opportunities, Risks, and the 
Specter of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (2013) (dis-
cussing the history of financing solar panel facilities and how to improve these 
financing mechanisms). 
 61. CORY ET AL., supra note 60, at vi, 4–8, 21–24; KOLLINS ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 19, 40–41. 
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course of the PPA.62 The rooftop property or land where the fa-
cility is built is leased from the customer, who also technically 
owns the facility.63 The solar panel company, however, main-
tains the right to sell the electricity to the consumer at dis-
counted rates, usually for an extended period of up to 20 years. 
At the end of the PPA, the consumer becomes the owner of the 
rights to the electricity, no longer purchasing it from the com-
pany.64 Throughout the lifetime of the installed solar panel fa-
cility, however, the consumer can still purchase electricity from 
their electric utility company when the consumer’s solar panels 
do not generate sufficient electricity to meet the consumer’s 
demand.65 In many states, the consumer also benefits from “net 
metering” laws that allow the consumer to sell excess electrici-
ty from their solar panel facility to the electric utility in ex-
change for money or credits to be used against the consumer’s 
potential future purchase of electricity from the utility.66 
The third-party PPA model works well in its niche and is 
designed to fit within the energy industry’s current structure. 
The model allows consumers, which otherwise would never 
have the necessary finances, to purchase electricity from solar 
panels. As discussed below, the model also benefits a state’s 
overall economic efficiency, and utilities stand to benefit from 
the model if proper regulation is introduced to formally harmo-
nize the third-party PPA with electric utility law. 
II.  HOW DEMAND-SIDE GENERATORS AND THE LAWS 
THAT FACILITATE THEM IMPROVE THE MODERN 
UTILITY MODEL 
The scaling model for generation—wherein cheaper meth-
ods of generation are used before more expensive facilities are 
dispatched—still means that a large amount of generation ca-
 
 62. See generally KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 2–3; Solar Power Pur-
chase Agreement Graphic, supra note 58. 
 63. KARLYNN CORY ET AL., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE 
ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/FS-6A2-46668, POWER PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT CHECKLIST FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 7 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46668.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Solar Power Purchase Agreement Graphic, supra note 58. 
 66. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, supra note 8; Solar Power Pur-
chase Agreement Graphic, supra note 58. For a sample contract exemplifying a 
typical third-party PPA, see SolarCity Corp., Solar Power Purchase Agree-
ment (City of San Jose California), http://www3.sanjoseca.gov/ 
clerk/Agenda/20110920/20110920_02a2sjfacon.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
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pacity is unused most of the time.67 Even with coordination be-
tween the thousands of electric utilities and generators, there 
are still plenty of generating facilities that are left unused more 
often than not.68 The need for a scaling model can be reduced by 
using generating facilities that inherently tend to match the 
ebb and flow of consumer demand throughout the day: solar 
panels.69 
Many states are encouraging the construction of solar pow-
er facilities to compete with conventional power plants, and are 
generally doing so in a narrowly tailored and thoughtful man-
ner.70 In effect, solar panel companies like Mr. Shear’s Eagle 
Point Solar reduce the consumer’s need to purchase electricity 
on the market.71 
Section A of Part II first analyzes the third-party PPA 
model, discussing how this model can provide benefits within 
the existing framework for the electricity industry. Section A 
then notes that the model also imposes certain inequities on 
the industry. Section B analyzes the reasoning of the Iowa Su-
preme Court in SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities Board as it ap-
plies to third-party PPAs.72 Section C examines the different 
laws and regulations that states have enacted to responsibly 
 
 67. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, MASS. INST. TECH. CENTER FOR ENERGY & 
ENVTL. POL’Y RES., COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND INVESTMENT IN 
NEW GENERATING CAPACITY 7 (2006), available at http://dspace.mit 
.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/45055/2006-009.pdf (“[I]n New England in 2001, 
93% of the energy was supplied by 55% of the installed generating capacity 
while the remaining 45% of the capacity supplied only about 7% of the ener-
gy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Why Solar?, ENGINEERING.COM, http://www.engineering.com/ 
SustainableEngineering/RenewableEnergyEngineering/ 
SolarEnergyEngineering/WhySolarEnergy/tabid/3893/Default.aspx (last visit-
ed Nov. 4, 2014) (“Solar power generation has several advantages over other 
forms of electricity generation” including “[m]atching [p]eak [t]ime [o]utput 
with [p]eak [t]ime [d]emand.”). Solar power is also being used to meet off-peak 
demand by means of solar thermal energy, which has potential for innovative 
energy storage. Matthew L. Wald, Arizona Utility Tries Storing Solar Energy 
for Use in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/business/energy-environment/arizona-utility-tries 
-storing-solar-energy-for-use-in-the-dark.html.  
 70. Cf. 3rd-Party Solar PV Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), supra note 
7 (mapping those states that have affirmatively authorized third-party solar 
PPAs). 
 71. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, supra note 8; Solar Power Pur-
chase Agreement Graphic, supra note 58. 
 72. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 13-0642, 2014 WL 3377074 
(Iowa July 11, 2014, as corrected Aug. 14, 2014). 
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encourage this model for solar panel facilities and proposes 
other supplementary provisions that can further enhance the 
appeal of third-party PPAs both for consumers and electric util-
ities. 
A. ANALYZING THE THIRD-PARTY POWER PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT MODEL 
In effect, the third-party PPA reduces the consumer’s need 
to purchase electricity from the utility by offering the consumer 
a source selling power on the demand side of the relationship. 
In the eyes of the district court in Iowa, this was simply a crea-
tive form of energy efficiency, which has the same end result of 
reducing the consumer’s need to purchase electricity from the 
utility.73 From an opposing viewpoint, however, it is an explicit 
provision of the third-party PPA that the solar panel company 
sells electricity to the consumer, much like the electric utility 
does.74 To the electric utility, this looks a lot like competition, 
even though the utility’s regulating commission has given the 
utility a monopoly for an exclusive service area. 
Despite an electric utility’s understandable concerns with 
the third-party PPA model, the model is actually quite compat-
ible with the existing system. The era of monolithic, perfectly 
vertically integrated utilities is over; wholesale electricity gen-
eration is established as a competitive marketplace.75 In this 
competitive marketplace, solar panel companies in third-party 
PPAs have a primary function that is essentially the same as 
that of NUGs: to generate and sell electricity. The key distinc-
tion, however, is that in a traditionally regulated state, a utility 
company with an exclusive service territory can argue that the 
solar panel company is selling retail electricity within the utili-
ty’s territory, rather than selling wholesale electricity like a 
typical NUG. 
However, the modern competitive model of deregulated 
states generally mitigates this issue, allowing the third-party 
PPA’s demand-side generation to neatly fold into the already 
 
 73. SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, at 14 (“[A] third-party developer of 
renewable energy systems, which essentially provides the customer the same 
service [as a provider of behind-the-meter energy efficiency services] by differ-
ent means, should be treated similarly.”). 
 74. See Ethan Howland, The Four Greatest Challenges Utilities Face in 
2014, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-four 
-greatest-challenges-utilities-face-in-2014/202574. 
 75. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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existing coordinated monitoring of consumer demand.76 A new 
third-party PPA reduces the consumer’s need to purchase elec-
tricity from the grid, but this leaves the job duties of control 
centers and their transmission operators unaltered; these con-
trol centers continue to monitor electricity demand to deter-
mine how much supply-side generation must occur, and the 
demand-side PPAs simply reduce the first of the three factors 
that these operators monitor: the amount of electricity de-
manded by consumers.77 Consequently, the scaling model’s mer-
it order—for firing up power plants and changing power source 
combinations as demand fluctuates—continues to operate 
based on the lowest marginal cost of production.78 In fact, the 
reduced total demand on the utility actually means that the 
utility remains on the cheaper end of the merit order’s sliding 
scale of production.79 
Concurrently, third-party PPAs help maximize efficiency in 
a competitive model. Solar power generation peaks in the mid-
dle of the day and in the summer, which matches consumer 
demand peaks.80 This inherent matching between generation 
and demand can reduce the need to build additional capital-
intensive power plants that are only fired up when demand is 
peaking,81 or to keep online old power plants that have reduced 
efficiency and higher pollution rates.82 Thereby, demand-side 
solar PPAs can actually minimize stagnant waste for supply-
side generators. Essentially, solar PPAs can further facilitate 
the efficiency of an already interconnected grid of coordinating 
utilities.83 
Furthermore, third-party PPAs help facilitate deregulation 
in those states where this trend has occurred. Deregulated 
states often face the challenge of getting new competitors to en-
 
 76. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 77. See WARWICK, supra note 15, at 3.5. 
 78. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 77; Energy 
Efficiency As a Resource, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., 
http://aceee.org/topics/energy-efficiency-resource (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) 
(“Energy savings from customer energy efficiency programs are typically 
achieved at 1/3 the cost of new generation resources.”). 
 79. Cf. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 3.8. 
 80. Why Solar?, supra note 69. 
 81. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 77; En-
ergy Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78. 
 82. See WARWICK, supra note 15, at 3.5 (explaining potential sources of 
inefficiency in various generating plants). 
 83. Cf. id. at 4.3 (describing the integration of local and remote power 
generators). 
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ter into the formerly exclusive territory of an incumbent utili-
ty.84 Without competitors in the market, consumers will turn 
back to their incumbent utility, defeating the purpose of dereg-
ulation. Laws that make third-party PPAs legal and encourage 
their implementation can create a host of new competitors in 
the form of solar panel companies eager to serve customers 
across the state. This facilitates states’ goals of deregulation 
and increasing consumer choice.85 In addition, much like the 
control centers and their transmission operators, the power ex-
changes of deregulated states can remain intact, as they func-
tion on the supply-side and essentially fold third-party PPA 
considerations into consumer-demand calculations. 
B. ANALYZING SZ ENTERPRISES V. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD 
The case of SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities Board arose as 
a result of the City of Dubuque’s desire to enter into a third-
party PPA with SZ Enterprises (doing business as Eagle Point 
Solar).86 Eagle Point Solar filed a Petition for Declaratory Order 
with the Iowa Utilities Board to establish whether Eagle Point 
Solar would be operating as a public utility.87 Iowa Code § 476.1 
defines “public utility” to include entities “[f]urnishing . . . elec-
tricity to the public for compensation.”88 The Iowa Utilities 
Board held that Eagle Point Solar would be operating as a pub-
lic utility under its third-party PPA, and therefore prohibited 
Eagle Point Solar from entering into this PPA with the City of 
Dubuque.89 Eagle Point Solar appealed the decision, and the 
Iowa District Court for Polk County reversed, holding that Ea-
gle Point Solar would not be operating as a public utility.90 
The decision was appealed again, and the Iowa Supreme 
Court heard the case. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s decision and gave Mr. Shear the go-ahead to use 
the third-party PPA model.91 The court noted that homeowners 
who have purchased and installed solar panels at their own ex-
 
 84. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 85. WARWICK, supra note 15, at 6.7. 
 86. SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, at 3. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. IOWA CODE § 476.1 (2014); see also SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, 
at 7. 
 89. SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, at 5. 
 90. Id. at 14. 
 91. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 13-0642, 2014 WL 3377074 
(Iowa July 11, 2014, as corrected Aug. 14, 2014). 
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pense are not regulated by the Iowa Utilities Board.92 The court 
reasoned that therefore the real issue was not the supplying of 
electricity on the demand side of the meter, but rather the crea-
tive financing method, which allowed the solar panel company 
to bear the upfront costs.93 The court also emphasized that solar 
power companies do not wield as much monopolistic power as 
electric utilities, and that any third-party PPA transaction was 
an “arms-length transaction between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller,” reducing potential for abuse or consumer protec-
tion issues.94 The court did express concern for electric utilities 
losing customers, but ultimately found no evidence that the 
“economic health of regulated providers has been adversely af-
fected in states such as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colo-
rado,” where the third-party PPA model has been well accept-
ed.95 After weighing eight factors that included these above-
mentioned considerations, the court concluded, “the balance of 
factors point away from a finding that the third-party PPA for a 
behind-the-meter solar generation facility” constitutes a public 
utility subject to regulation.96 
C. THE VALUE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ADDRESSING THE 
THIRD-PARTY PPA MODEL 
Recognizing the value that third-party PPAs can bring to a 
market, nearly half of the states have taken action to encour-
age their use, predominantly through legislation and regula-
tion.97 As seen below, these provisions are often part of a coor-
dinated effort to encourage residential solar panel installation. 
In addition to formally recognizing the third-party PPA model, 
states have also incorporated the model as a form of energy ef-
ficiency, set up loan programs, facilitated outside financing of 
the solar panel facilities, and established a fluid electricity 
model so that consumers can sell surplus electricity to their 
utility.98 
 
 92. Id. at *25. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *26. 
 96. Id. at *27. 
 97. 3rd-Party Solar PV Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), supra note 7. 
 98. See Loan Programs, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/solarpolicyguide/?id=15 (last visit-
ed Nov. 4, 2014); Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, 
http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014); cf. Net Metering, NAT’L GRID, http://www.nationalgridus.com/ 
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At the same time, however, states recognize that third-
party PPAs leave the electric utility at the mercy of the con-
sumer. The consumer still has the ability to purchase electricity 
from the electric utility whenever the consumer’s solar power is 
insufficient, making the consumer-utility relationship some-
thing of a one-way street; the utility does not have the same 
luxury of choosing when to offer its services to the consumer.99 
Therefore, states have also taken action to mitigate these ineq-
uities between the consumer and the utility. Net metering is 
one potential mechanism, under which states may cap the 
amount of credit that consumers earn towards next month’s bill 
when they generate more electricity than they consume in the 
current month.100 Another option that states have considered is 
to include cost-shifting provisions that ensure that consumers 
with third-party PPAs still pay their share of a utility’s non-
operating costs, namely for the utility’s transmission and dis-
tribution infrastructure costs.101 
Subsection 1 discusses how to define and formally recog-
nize the third-party PPA model. Subsection 2 addresses how to 
incorporate the model into energy efficiency standards, while 
Subsection 3 does the same for renewable portfolio standards. 
Subsection 4 discusses the important public and private financ-
ing tools for third-party PPAs. Subsection 5 balances the bene-
fits of third-party PPAs against the costs to electric utilities 
through a discussion of net metering and electric utilities’ non-
operating costs. Finally, Subsection 6 argues for the use of feed-
in tariffs as an additional equitable incentive that builds on the 
principles of net metering. These Subsections cite exemplary 
statutory language—where such language exists—from states 
 
masselectric/business/energyeff/4_net-mtr.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) 
(“[N]et metering allows these [distributed generation] customers to financially 
balance out the total amount of energy imported with the total amount of en-
ergy exported over the course of a billing period (typically about a month).”). 
 99. Cf. Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, supra note 98 
(“[S]ome utilities perceive net metering policies as lost revenue opportuni-
ties.”). 
 100. Cf. Net Metering, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EF-
FICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/solarpolicyguide/?id=17 (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2014) (describing the Interstate Renewable Energy Council’s best prac-
tices for net metering). The ensuing sections of this Note discuss the balancing 
of these various considerations to reach an equitable middle ground between 
the interests of utilities and parties entering into third-party PPAs. 
 101. See, e.g., Arizona Public Service Company, Docket No. E-01345A-13-
0248, at 6, 29 (Arizona Corp. Comm’n Nov. 14, 2013), http://images.edocket 
.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000149849.pdf. 
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that recognize third-party PPAs and have adopted laws ad-
dressing these various issues.  
1. Defining and Formally Recognizing Third-Party Energy 
Producers 
The first step in encouraging third-party PPAs is to formal-
ly recognize their existence and legitimacy. A basic tenet of the 
model is that the power generation occurs on the demand side 
of the meter.102 Many also specify that the solar panel facility 
must be connected to the grid for power transfers to and from 
the electric utility.103 These definitions provide the benefit of 
distinct clarity for how solar panel companies can operate and 
structure their third-party PPAs.104 From the electric utility’s 
perspective, the consistency between all third-party PPAs can 
make the utility’s job more manageable, foreclosing the threat 
of having to deal with various unwieldy consumer contracts; 
this allows for a more streamlined analysis of the total reduced 
consumer demand and minimizes the need for the electric utili-
ty to give a consumer’s solar panel facility additional, special 
attention.105 
Consistent with recognizing solar companies’ third-party 
PPAs, states also establish at the outset that these solar panel 
 
 102. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.02 (2014) (recognizing a “Host Customer” as 
“a Customer with a . . . Facility that generates electricity on the Customer’s 
side of the meter”). 
 103. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1014(d) (2014) (establishing net 
metering for customers that contract with “a third party that owns or operates 
an electric generation facility that . . . [u]ses as its primary source of fuel so-
lar,” “[i]s located on the customer’s premises,” and “[i]s interconnected and op-
erated in parallel with an electric distribution company’s transmission and 
distribution facilities”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-306(a)(4) (Lex-
isNexis 2013) (recognizing as an “[e]ligible customer-generator” a “customer 
that . . . contracts with a third party that owns and operates a . . . solar . . . 
electric generating facility” that is “located on the customer’s premises,” “is 
interconnected and operated in parallel with an electric company’s transmis-
sion and distribution facilities,” and is “intended primarily to offset all or part 
of the customer’s own electricity requirements”). 
 104. See TONY DUTZIK & ROB SARGENT, ENV’T AM. RESEARCH & POLICY 
CTR., LIGHTING THE WAY: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM AMERICA’S TOP 12 SO-
LAR STATES 31 (2013), available at http://www.environmentamericacenter 
.org/sites/environment/files/reports/Lighting_the_way_EnvAM_scrn.pdf 
(“Leading solar states have passed laws clarifying the legal status of third-
party PPAs, giving consumers and the solar industry the confidence they need 
to develop the business model in their states.”). 
 105. See generally KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 7–14 (discussing chal-
lenges for the definition of electric utilities in regard to third-party PPAs, po-
tential solutions, and the benefits and implications of those solutions). 
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companies are not public utilities.106 Alternatively, some states’ 
regulating agencies have examined their statutory definition of 
a “public utility” to determine that the third-party PPAs simply 
did not meet definition of a public utility, much like the Iowa 
Supreme Court.107 While it may seem unnecessary for there to 
be a law to the same effect once a regulating agency determines 
that third-party PPAs do not raise utility licensure issues, the 
existence of such a law provides stability, an attractive consid-
eration for potential solar panel companies. 
2. Using Third-Party PPAs To Satisfy Energy Efficiency 
Standards 
A number of states have required their electric utilities to 
meet certain energy efficiency standards by a given deadline.108 
Energy efficiency is currently one of the most cost-effective 
ways to manage energy demands.109 In order to promote and 
 
 106. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-13-13.1.A, B (2013) (“[A] person not 
otherwise a public utility shall not be deemed to be a public utility . . . solely 
because the person owns or controls all or any part of any renewable energy 
distributed generation facility that: (1) is located on the host’s site; 
(2) produces electric energy used at the host’s site and sold to the host or the 
host’s tenants or employees located at the host’s site; and (3) shares a common 
point of connection with the electric utility serving the area. . . . Nothing con-
tained in this section shall be interpreted to prohibit the sale of energy pro-
duced by the renewable energy distributed generation facility to the electric 
utility serving the area in which the renewable energy distributed generation 
facility is located.”); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.916(a)(2), (k) (West Supp. 
2014) (defining a “[d]istributed renewable generation owner” to include “a re-
tail electric customer on whose side of the meter distributed renewable gener-
ation is installed and operated, regardless of whether the customer takes own-
ership of the distributed renewable generation” and establishing that 
“[n]either a retail electric customer that uses distributed renewable generation 
nor the owner of the distributed renewable generation that the retail electric 
customer uses is an electric utility”). 
 107. SolarCity Corporation, Docket No. E-20690A-09-0346, at 71 (Arizona 
Corp. Comm’n July 12, 2010), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/ 
0000114068.pdf (“[W]hen SolarCity Corporation provides services to a school, 
government, or non-profit entity, specifically limited to such an individual cus-
tomer serving only a single premises of that customer, pursuant to a Solar 
Services Agreement . . . SolarCity Corporation is not acting as a public service 
corporation.”). 
 108. Energy Efficiency Resource Standards, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Feb. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/ 
summarymaps/EERS_map.pdf. California, Washington, and Minnesota have 
gone so far as to require the utilities to secure all cost-effective energy efficien-
cy resources. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 75. 
 109. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 26 
(“Energy efficiency is typically the least expensive way to meet consumer 
needs for energy services.”); id. at 77 (“Energy efficiency is considered cost-
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achieve energy efficiency, many states are allowing demand-
side renewable energy facilities to be folded into the concept.110 
The Iowa district court reached this end result,111 but the above-
cited Connecticut statute, for example, specifically addresses 
the issue, eliminating the need for the courts to engage in such 
an in-depth analysis to reach the same conclusion. 
Third-party PPAs work well within the concept of energy 
efficiency, providing many of the same benefits that high-
efficiency appliances and other energy efficiency measures pro-
vide. One of the primary benefits of energy efficiency is that, 
from the electric utility’s perspective, each kilowatt saved is 
worth more than the cost of producing that kilowatt; the utility 
saves on transmission and distribution costs, system wear-and-
tear, and remains on the cheaper end of the merit order scale of 
power sources.112 Demand-side power sources provide these 
same benefits. For the consumer, energy efficiency not only 
means a reduced demand for electricity, but also cheaper elec-
tricity from the utility, which can be provided more dependably 
due to decreased overall demand on the system.113 Finally, for 
society as a whole, energy efficiency saves money, reduces the 
need for power plants, and reduces traditional air pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions.114 Again, it is easy to see how de-
 
effective when the cost of installing and maintaining measures that improve 
the efficiency of energy usage, compared with what the consumer would oth-
erwise do, is less than the total cost of building, maintaining, and operating 
the generation, transmission, and distribution facilities that would otherwise 
be needed to supply enough energy to achieve the same end-use over the same 
lifetime. There are also environmental costs of both energy supply and some 
energy efficiency measures, which can and should be considered in measuring 
cost-effectiveness.”); Energy Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78. 
 110. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-37x(a)(1) (2012) (“‘Energy-savings measure’ 
means any improvement to facilities or other energy-consuming systems de-
signed to reduce energy . . . consumption and operating costs and increase the 
operating efficiency of facilities or systems for their appointed functions. ‘En-
ergy-savings measure’ includes, but is not limited to, one or more of the follow-
ing: . . . (B) Class I renewable energy or solar thermal systems.”). 
 111. SZ Enters. Dist. Ct., supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 112. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 77; Energy 
Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78 (“Efficiency can also improve system 
reliability and allow utilities to reduce or manage the demand on their sys-
tems—in some cases offsetting the need to add new peak generation capaci-
ty.”). 
 113. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 77. 
 114. Id.; Energy Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78 (“Reducing fossil 
fuel use has many additional benefits including reducing air pollution (and 
greenhouse gasses) and decreasing the environmental impacts associated with 
fossil fuel production and use.”). 
BOLSTAD_5fmt 12/1/2014 2:44 PM 
728 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:705 
 
mand-side renewable generation facilities provide these same 
benefits, fitting neatly into the concept of energy efficiency. 
Electric utilities face one key concern that creates a disin-
centive to embrace energy efficiency: reduced consumer de-
mand means reduced sale volume and profit potential.115 Con-
ventional rate setting creates a conflict of interest, wherein the 
utilities are keen to encourage increased energy consumption, 
adverse to the public interest, in order to increase their sales 
and profits.116 One of the primary ways states have tackled this 
concern is by a regulatory concept known as “decoupling.”117 
This process begins with the standard rate determination 
based on the utility’s required revenue to meet costs and return 
on investment.118 In conventional rate setting, the rate then 
remains fixed, but in decoupling, rates are adjusted, based on 
variations in actual electricity sales, to ensure that the utility 
actually collects the required revenue; if sales dip below the ex-
pected level, rates increase to compensate.119 By ensuring a de-
pendable revenue stream sufficient to meet the electric utilities’ 
needs, utilities no longer have an incentive to encourage in-
creased energy consumption and can instead freely encourage 
energy efficiency and third-party PPAs. 
3. Using Third-Party PPAs To Satisfy Renewable Portfolio 
Standards 
Alongside energy efficiency standards, a number of states 
have also required their electric utilities to meet Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) by a certain deadline.120 These poli-
cies require that a certain percentage of electricity come from 
renewable sources, thereby encouraging the electric utilities to 
 
 115. Cf. Howland, supra note 74 (“[U]tility revenue is tied to sales vol-
ume.”). 
 116. Cf. id. (“[In 2014, u]tilities will push for changes while the solar indus-
try will fight to maintain policies that support distributed generation.”). 
 117. See generally REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULA-
TION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 1 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/861 (describing how 
decoupling “breaks the link between the amount of energy sold and the actual 
(allowed) revenue collected by the utility”). 
 118. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 182–83. 
 119. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 61, 86–87. 
 120. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Sept. 2014), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/ 
summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
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adopt renewable technologies.121 
In order to further enhance the appeal of third-party PPAs 
to electric utilities, states can allow electricity generated from 
these PPAs to be counted towards meeting RPS requirements. 
This is a very attractive provision for electric utilities, allowing 
them to meet their RPS without the actual burden of having to 
oversee the construction and operation of renewable generation 
facilities, or having to purchase such power from other utilities 
or NUGs.122 Renewable generation systems are already moni-
tored to determine load output,123 and, as discussed above, the-
se systems are connected to the electrical grid to facilitate 
transfers of power between the consumer and the electric utili-
ty. 
Utilities in many states can meet their RPS with Renewa-
ble Energy Certificates (RECs); each REC represents 1 mega-
watt-hour of electricity produced by a renewable generation fa-
cility.124 However, most states require that RECs stay with the 
consumer who generates the solar power, allowing the consum-
er to sell the RECs.125 These RECs are a key aspect in raising 
sufficient capital to overcome the primary hurdle of severe up-
front capital costs for constructing renewable energy facilities, 
as the RECs are used to attract outside investors to help fund 
the construction.126 In order to enhance the usefulness of RECs 
as a fundraising tool while simultaneously allowing utilities to 
 
 121. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850. 
 122. William Atkinson, Solar Leasing Shines, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2012, 
at 16, available at http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/03/solar 
-leasing-shines (noting that demand-side solar can “help utilities fulfill their 
obligations under renewable portfolio standards (RPS) without having to fund 
the capital costs themselves”). 
 123. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, DOE/EE-0307, GUIDE TO PURCHASING GREEN POWER: RENEWABLE 
ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, AND ON-SITE RENEWABLE 
GENERATION 28 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/ 
documents/purchasing_guide_for_web.pdf. 
 124. CORY ET AL., supra note 63, at 5. 
 125. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-306(g)(5) (West 2013) 
(“An eligible customer-generator or the eligible customer-generator’s assignee 
shall own and have title to all renewable energy attributes or renewable ener-
gy credits associated with any electricity produced by its electric generating 
system.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-A:9(IX) (2013) (“Renewable energy cred-
its shall remain the property of the customer-generator until such credits are 
sold or transferred.”). 
 126. See CORY ET AL., supra note 60, at 2; KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 
3; Solar Power Purchase Agreement Graphic, supra note 58. 
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satisfy RPS requirements, some states offer RECs arising from 
third-party PPAs to be counted towards a utility’s RPS re-
quirements at double the conventional rate.127 In effect, such 
statutes essentially invite utilities to help fund the construction 
of demand-side renewable generation facilities while still stay-
ing free of the obligations to oversee construction or perform 
maintenance and operation services. 
4. Creating State-Sponsored Loan Programs and Facilitating 
Outside Financing 
In order to further combat the challenges of high upfront 
capital costs, states can also make it easier for parties to ac-
quire the necessary capital to build a solar panel facility. One of 
the primary ways states do so is through a state-sponsored loan 
program.128 These loan programs can provide another tool for 
solar panel companies to acquire the necessary financing for 
the third-party PPA model’s success. States can also use this 
loan program as a scaling tool for controlling the degree to 
which third-party PPAs are implemented in a state. In addition 
to the state-sponsored loans, it is helpful for states to enact 
provisions clarifying the permissibility of outside financing, 
further facilitating and streamlining the fundraising process.129 
 
 127. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.286.040(2)(b) (2012) (“A qualifying utility may 
count distributed generation at double the facility’s electrical output if the 
utility: (i) Owns or has contracted for the distributed generation and the asso-
ciated renewable energy credits; or (ii) has contracted to purchase the associ-
ated renewable energy credits.”); see CORY ET AL., supra note 63, at 5 (discuss-
ing the value of renewable energy certificates). 
 128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-38.7-102(4) (2012) (“‘Clean energy 
loan’ means a loan in a maximum amount of twelve thousand five hundred 
dollars originated by a participating public lender or a participating private 
lender, including but not limited to a bank or mortgage lender, to a qualified 
borrower for the purpose of financing one or more clean energy improvements 
to the borrower’s primary residence, rental property, or place of business.”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-37x(c) (2012) (giving the state agency responsibility 
for “assisting in the structuring or arranging of financing for energy-savings 
performance contract projects”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8057(d)(1)(a) (2012) 
(“The Green Energy Endowment Program shall provide cash grants from the 
Green Energy Fund to customers that have constructed, purchased, leased or 
who have executed a power purchase agreement for renewable energy technol-
ogy and have placed such renewable energy technology in service.”). For more 
information on state-sponsored loan programs, see Loan Programs, supra note 
98. 
 129. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-37x(i) (“A guaranteed energy-
savings performance contract may provide for financing, including tax exempt 
financing, by a third party. The contract for third party financing may be sep-
arate from the energy-savings performance contract. A state agency or partici-
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Because the upfront capital costs are already so severe, 
these financing measures are most effective when they are able 
to spread the repayment of these costs over long timeframes 
with low-interest rates.130 Used in conjunction with all the other 
favorable financing and cost-saving measures discussed 
throughout this Section, consumers and third-party companies 
can continue to mitigate the challenge of high upfront capital 
costs. 
5. Net Metering, the Sale of Surplus Electricity to the Utility, 
and Balancing Inequities 
The final way in which states can ease the burden of capi-
tal costs is through the use of a fluid electricity transfer model, 
specifically by allowing the sale of the consumer’s surplus gen-
erated electricity back to the utility.131 As mentioned in Part 
I.C., a net metering law allows the consumer’s excess electricity 
for one month to be credited against the consumer’s potential 
future purchase of electricity from the utility.132 Governing ju-
risdictions first establish that net metering is permissible in 
their state133 and then set out the framework for their net me-
tering policy.134 
 
pating municipality may use designated funds, bonds, lease purchase agree-
ments or master lease for any energy-savings performance contracts, provided 
its use is consistent with the purpose of the appropriation.”). 
 130. Loan Programs, supra note 98. 
 131. See WIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 6, 12 (discussing how net me-
tering can help drive a solar market and stating that “[c]ustomer-generators 
realize the most financial benefit from net metering in this manner”). 
 132. See supra Part I.C. 
 133. See, e.g., 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-107.5(i) (1993) (“All electricity 
providers shall . . . offer net metering.”); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 15, § 901.1 
(2010) (“Eligible customer-generators utilizing renewable resources . . . may 
elect and shall be afforded the opportunity to participate in net energy meter-
ing.”). 
 134. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1014(e)(1) (2012) (requiring Dela-
ware’s Commission to “[p]rovide for customers to be credited in kilowatt-hours 
(kWh), valued at an amount per kilowatt-hour equal to the sum of delivery 
service charges and supply service charges for residential customers and the 
sum of the volumetric energy (kWh) components of the delivery service charg-
es and supply service charges for nonresidential customers for any excess pro-
duction of their generating facility that exceeds the customer’s on-site con-
sumption of kWh in a billing period” and specifying that “[e]xcess kWh credits 
shall be credited to subsequent billing periods to offset a customer’s consump-
tion in those billing periods. At the end of the annualized billing period, a cus-
tomer may request a payment from the electric supplier for any excess kWh 
credits. The payment shall be calculated by multiplying the excess kWh cred-
its by the customer’s supply service rate”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-306(f)(5), (6) (West 2013) (allowing “eligible customer-generator[s]” to “ac-
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Net metering, however, poses a problem of inequity for 
utilities and consumers who are not able to install solar panels 
(on their own or through a PPA), as compared with those con-
sumers who can. This is because as the electric utility’s total 
demand decreases, and some consumers even sell their surplus 
electricity back to the utility, the utility’s dependable consumer 
base shrinks; therefore, the utility must shift its non-operating 
costs—primarily for the generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion infrastructures—to a more concentrated pool of consum-
ers.135 In effect, this leaves the less-fortunate consumers with 
the lion’s share of the utility’s non-operating expenses, increas-
ing their electrical bill while the more-fortunate consumer’s bill 
drops. A California study contests this argument,136 but else-
where states have sought to cap net metering in order to miti-
gate this negative externality. Many states do so by capping the 
cumulative capacity of all net metering operations as a per-
centage of the state’s peak load capacity.137 Connecticut takes 
 
crue net excess generation for a period . . . not to exceed 12 months” and re-
quiring the utility to “pay each eligible customer-generator for the dollar value 
of any accrued net excess generation remaining at the end of the previous 12-
month period”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-A:9(V)(b) (2013) (allowing the cus-
tomer to be paid for their excess electricity or have it be credited to counteract 
the customer’s future consumption); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 15, § 902.3 (“[I]f the 
electricity generated during the billing period by the customer-generator’s fa-
cility exceeds the customer-generator’s kWh usage during the billing period 
(excess generation), the customer-generator’s next bill will be credited by the 
Electric Company for the excess generation at the full retail distribution rate. 
The credit for excess generation shall be expressed as a dollar value on the 
customer-generator’s bill. If the full credit for excess generation is not ex-
hausted during the next billing period, the remaining credit shall be carried 
over until such time as the full credit has been exhausted.”). 
 135. Cf. R. Thomas Beach & Patrick G. McGuire, Evaluating the Benefits 
and Costs of Net Energy Metering in California, CROSSBORDER ENERGY (Jan. 
2013), available at http://votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ 
Crossborder-Energy-CA-Net-Metering-Cost-Benefit-Jan-2013-final.pdf (noting 
“recent claims by California’s investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that the state’s 
net energy metering (NEM) policy causes substantial cost shifts between en-
ergy customers with solar photovoltaic (PV) systems and other non-solar cus-
tomers, particularly in the residential market”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1014(e)(7) (“If the total generating capacity 
of all customer-generation using net metering systems served by an electric 
utility exceeds 5% of the capacity necessary to meet the electric utility’s aggre-
gated customer monthly peak demand for a particular calendar year, the elec-
tric utility may elect not to provide net metering services to any additional 
customer-generators.”); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-107.5(j) (1993) (“An electric-
ity provider shall provide net metering to eligible customers until the load of 
its net metering customers equals 5% of the total peak demand supplied by 
that electricity provider during the previous year.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
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an even more aggressive measure, requiring the third-party 
company to project the benefits of the installed facility, and pe-
nalizing the company for under- or over-estimating those bene-
fits.138 Effectively, instead of net metering, this establishes 
something of a strict matching principle between estimates and 
actual results, returning the spillover costs that the consumer 
is shifting to the utility back to the demand side of the equa-
tion. 
States also attempt to mitigate the potential negative ex-
ternalities of demand-side generation facilities by limiting the 
size of these facilities. Size determinations are generally set as 
a percentage of the consumer’s historic use,139 a strict wattage 
 
§ 704.773(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (“A utility shall offer net metering . . . to 
the customer-generators operating within its service area until the cumulative 
capacity of all net metering systems operating in this State is equal to 3 per-
cent of the total peak capacity of all utilities in this State.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 39-26.4-3(a)(2) (2013) (“The aggregate amount of net metering in Rhode Is-
land shall not exceed three percent (3%) of peak load.”); 220 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 18.07(1)(a) (2012) (“Each Distribution Company shall make Net Meter-
ing services available to Host Customers such that the aggregate capacity of 
. . . Net Metering Facilities . . . does not exceed 3% of the Distribution Compa-
ny’s highest historical peak load.”). 
 138. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-37x(m) (2013) (“The energy-savings perfor-
mance contract shall require the qualified energy service provider to provide 
to the state agency or participating municipality an annual reconciliation of 
the guaranteed energy cost savings. If the reconciliation reveals a shortfall in 
annual energy cost savings, the qualified energy service provider shall make 
payment to the state agency or participating municipality in the amount of the 
shortfall. If the reconciliation reveals an excess in annual energy cost savings, 
the excess savings shall remain with the state agency or municipality, and 
shall not be used to cover potential energy cost savings shortages in subse-
quent years or actual energy cost savings shortages in previous contract 
years.”). 
 139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(a)(VIII) (2013) (“‘Retail distributed 
generation’ means a renewable energy resource that is located on the site of a 
customer’s facilities and is interconnected on the customer’s side of the utility 
meter. In addition, retail distributed generation shall provide electric energy 
primarily to serve the customer’s load and shall be sized to supply no more 
than one hundred twenty percent of the average annual consumption of elec-
tricity by the customer at that site.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.021(10)(b) (2013) 
(limiting generating capacity to “not more than 150 percent of that . . . per-
son’s requirements for electricity on an annual basis for the premises on which 
the individual system is located”); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.916(k) (West 
Supp. 2014) (requiring that “the estimated annual amount of electricity to be 
produced by the distributed renewable generation is less than or equal to the 
retail electric customer’s estimated annual electricity consumption.”); 4 COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 723-3 3652(ff) (“‘Retail renewable distributed generation’ means 
a renewable energy resource that is located on the premises of an end-use elec-
tric consumer [located within the service territory of a qualified retail utility] 
and is interconnected on the end-use electric consumer’s side of the meter. . . . 
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cap,140 or both.141 A state-imposed wattage cap can limit the in-
equities between the solar-owning consumer, the conventional 
consumer, and the utility that is otherwise left at the mercy of 
the solar-owning consumer due to net metering. Wattage caps 
reduce the potential for spillover costs that may otherwise be 
shifted to the concentrated pool of conventional consumers by 
effectively turning demand-side generation into a program that 
removes these consumers from the utility’s demand equation by 
zeroing-out their household demand.142 
However, there are better options for states than imposing 
a wattage cap. States can ensure that consumers with third-
party PPAs continue to pay their share of a utility’s non-
operating costs by cost shifting, allowing the utility to charge a 
fee for consumers’ net metering benefits. Certain state regula-
tory commissions, notably Arizona’s, have already acted to give 
utilities this power, allowing them to charge residential con-
sumers with solar panel facilities a fee per kilowatt per 
month.143 There is debate as to whether a flat charge, a rate-
based system, or a “distributed generation premium” is the best 
mechanism,144 but each of these options provides a channel to 
equitably return costs to consumers with third-party PPAs. De-
spite concerns from solar advocates that cost shifting impedes 
solar industry growth,145 such cost shifting is appropriate be-
 
Retail renewable distributed generation shall be sized to supply no more than 
one hundred twenty percent of the average annual consumption of electricity 
by the end-use electric consumer at that site.”). 
 140. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.02 (2012) (capping eligible electricity prod-
ders to “a plant or equipment that is used to produce, manufacture, or other-
wise generate electricity and that is not a transmission facility and that has a 
design capacity of 60 kilowatts or less”); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 15, § 902.3 
(2010) (limiting net metering to facilities with “capacity less than or equal to 
100 kilowatts”). 
 141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1014(d)(1)(a), (5) (2012) (limiting such facili-
ties to “a capacity of not more than 25 kW” for “residential customers” and re-
quiring that they are “designed to produce no more than 110% of the host cus-
tomer’s expected aggregate electrical consumption, calculated on the average 
of the 2 previous 12-month periods of actual electrical usage at the time of in-
stallation of energy generating equipment”). 
 142. Cf. Beach & McGuire, supra note 135. 
 143. Arizona Public Service Company, Docket No. E-01345A-13-0248, at 6, 
29 (Arizona Corp. Comm’n Nov. 14, 2013), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/ 
docketpdf/0000149849.pdf.  
 144. Id. at 15–21. 
 145. See Herman K. Trabish, Arizona Preserves Net Metering by Charging 
a Small Fee to Solar Owners, GREENTECHSOLAR (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www 
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Charging-a-Fee-to-Solar-Owners-Preserves 
-Net-Metering-in-Arizona. 
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cause consumers with net metering continue to benefit from 
utilities’ transmission and distribution infrastructure.146 While 
states may want to mitigate the inequities that the privileged 
consumer imposes on the local utility and other residential con-
sumers through peak load caps or wattage caps, states should 
consider simply increasing the degree of cost shifting that oc-
curs during the net metering billing process. If a utility can 
continue to bill all consumers for non-operating costs, states do 
not have any incentive to limit the size of solar facilities for res-
idential consumers with third-party PPAs; states actually have 
a disincentive to impose wattage caps, since these caps waste-
fully limit the revenue stream of third-party PPAs. In turn, re-
duced revenue streams will limit the number of third-party 
PPAs that are actually implemented, which will consequently 
reduce the benefits discussed above in Part II.A. Therefore, this 
Note advises against such wattage caps, instead encouraging 
cost-shifting provisions that allow utilities to continue billing 
privileged consumers for the utilities’ non-operating costs. 
6. Feed-In Tariffs 
With legislation in place to ensure that all consumers pay 
for their utility’s non-operating costs, states can continue to 
maximize the financial opportunities for third-party PPAs, and 
consequently the number of solar panel installations occurring. 
A useful mechanism to further enhance the third-party PPA is 
the feed-in tariff (FIT), under which a consumer sells electricity 
back to the utility at an agreed-upon rate, usually at a premi-
um.147 Sales at a premium increase the revenue streams for 
third-party PPAs, increasing their financial viability and allow-
ing these PPAs to be adopted in greater numbers; studies have 
found well-adapted FITs to be among the most economically ef-
ficient and effective means of promoting renewable energy.148 
 
 146. See Christopher Martin, Arizona Approves Grid-Connection Fees for 
Solar Rooftops, BLOOMBERG POL. (Nov. 15, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/arizona-regulators-impose-power 
-grid-fees-for-solar-roofs.html. 
 147. TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWA-
BLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/TP-6A2-44849, A POLICYMAKER’S 
GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY DESIGN, at v (2010), available at http:// 
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf; Feed-In Tariffs, NAT’L RENEWABLE EN-
ERGY LABORATORY (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/ 
state_local_activities/basics_tariffs.html. 
 148. Commission Staff Working Document, Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 
The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, at 3 (Jan. 23, 
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_res_ 
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These FITs generally have three key provisions, building on the 
ideas outlined for net metering and other aspects of third-party 
PPAs: (1) guaranteed access to the grid; (2) stable, long-term 
purchase agreements; and (3) payment levels based on the cost 
of the power source’s generation.149 Regarding payment levels, 
FITs are most effective when payments are designed to cover 
the cost of the project plus an estimated profit.150 While FITs 
work in both conventionally-regulated and deregulated states, 
the details must be designed according to each state’s regulato-
ry structure, particularly to determine who awards payments 
for the FIT policy and how costs are distributed to various rate 
classes.151 The most important challenge facing state-
implemented FITs is federal preemption due to the Public Util-
ity Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which requires that sales of 
electricity to electric utilities from certain qualifying facilities 
must occur at avoided cost rates—that is, the price the utility 
would have had to pay to generate the electricity itself or pur-
chase the electricity from another source.152 Several states have 
supported FITs through a variety of means,153 and have been 
mindful of this preemption issue, basing the premium tariff 
rate on avoided cost so as to avoid federal preemption.154 Be-
sides being constitutionally necessary, avoided-cost rates pro-
vide the benefit of serving as an equitable cap on the use of 
FITs; by preventing the tariff rate from being set at any more 
of a premium than the marginal cost of production would be, 
utilities increase their efficiency and pay no more to residential 
consumers than they would to any NUG facility.155 
 
working_document_en.pdf; cf. Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tar-
iffs In Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 938–42, n.5, n.6, & n.10 (2014) (criti-
cizing the romanticizing of feed-in tariffs and advocating a realistic application 
of feed-in tariffs alongside other renewable energy methods). 
 149. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 147, at vi. 
 150. Id. at vii, 7. 
 151. Id. at 14; see generally id. at 92–98. 
 152. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117, § 210. 
 153. Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable 
Electricity Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), http:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
 154. See California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047, at ¶¶ 65–67 
(2010); Feed-In Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(June 4, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.cfm 
(stating that Vermont sets rates with an “avoided-cost cap”). 
 155. Beyond constitutional concerns, there are a number of additional nu-
ances on how to appropriately structure FITs to improve their effectiveness. 
See Davies & Allen, supra note 148, at 997–1005. 
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In total, several states have sought to encourage the devel-
opment of a new market for third-party PPAs. This has typical-
ly been accomplished through a comprehensive yet narrowly-
tailored set of laws and regulations that help the third-party 
PPA model overcome its challenges while mitigating the poten-
tial for negative externalities. 
III.  THE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS FOR ANY LAW 
ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY POWER PURCHASE 
AGREEMENTS, AND HOW TO MAXIMIZE THEIR 
EFFECTIVE INCORPORATION INTO THE ELECTRIC 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 
In nearly half the states in the country, the legal permissi-
bility of third-party PPAs remains unknown.156 This unregulat-
ed area presents an opportunity for economic and environmen-
tal benefits to all involved parties, and these states should 
address this burgeoning issue.157 In so doing, however, legisla-
tors must recognize that regulation is a double-edged sword 
that can provide clarity and streamlining or leave parties 
stranded with problems created by other members of the mar-
ket. Therefore, Part III of this Note provides a clear statement 
of how states can best structure their laws and regulations to 
maximize the benefits of third-party PPAs while minimizing 
potential negative externalities. Following each section are the 
statutory provisions that states should implement to facilitate 
third-party PPAs and maximize their effective incorporation in-
to modern electricity regulation. Where possible, these statuto-
ry provisions draw on language that has proven successful for 
states supporting the third-party PPA model. 
At the outset, states must first formally recognize and de-
fine the structure of a third-party PPA. This definition should 
specify that power generation occurs on the demand side of the 
meter. States seeking to enact a modest and narrowly tailored 
rule can specify that the power source is a solar facility (or a 
renewable energy facility), and ensure the source’s connection 
to the electrical grid for transfers of power between the con-
 
 156. 3rd-Party Solar PV Power Purchase Agreement (PPAs), supra note 7. 
Solar panel companies in deregulated states do not face the uncertainty of 
whether they can use the third-party PPA model, since a competitive retail 
market is the very idea of deregulation. Nevertheless, these states can still 
benefit from the various provisions that further enhance the third-party PPA 
model. 
 157. See Tracy, supra note 11. 
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sumer and the electric utility. All states should include provi-
sions clarifying that these third-party generators are not elec-
tric utilities subject to regulatory licensing protocol or alter 
their current definition of electric utility to provide the same 
clarity. These clarifications and definitions provide solar panel 
companies with confidence that they can operate under an ap-
proved business model and streamline the process for all in-
volved parties.158 
 
 Section 1. Definitions.159 
 (a) “Host” means the customer of a public utility who 
purchases the electric energy produced by an independent solar 
energy producer’s solar energy distributed generation facility. 
  (b) “Independent solar energy producer” means a person 
employing one or more solar energy systems for the generation 
of electricity for any one or more of the following purposes: 
   (i) Its own use or the use of its tenants; 
   (ii) The use of, or sale to, not more than two other 
entities or persons per generation system, for use on the real 
property on which the electricity is generated, or on real prop-
erty immediately adjacent thereto. 
 (c) “Solar energy distributed generation facility” means 
any configuration of solar energy devices that 
  (i) Shares a common point of connection with the 
public utility serving the area; and 
  (ii) Collects solar energy on the demand side of the 
facility’s electric meter. 
  
 Section 2. Non-Utility Status of Persons Owning  
Solar Energy Distributed Generation Facilities.160 A per-
son not otherwise a public utility shall not be deemed to be a 
public utility solely because the person owns or controls all or 
any part of any solar energy distributed generation facility 
that: 
 (a) Is located on the host’s site; 
 (b) Produces electric energy used at the host’s site and 
sold to the host or the host’s tenants or employees located at 
the host’s site; and 
 
 158. See DUTZIK & SARGENT, supra note 104; KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 
19, at 7–14. 
 159. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-13-13.1.A, B (2012). 
 160. See id.; TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.916(a)(2), (k) (West Supp. 2014). 
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 (c) Shares a common point of connection with the public 
utility serving the area. 
  
 Section 3. Guaranteed Connection for Solar Energy  
 Distributed Generation Facilities.161 
 (a) A public utility shall connect a solar energy distribut-
ed generation facility to the existing electricity distribution sys-
tem within 90 days of a request by a host and an independent 
solar energy producer. 
 (b) A public utility that fails to connect a solar energy 
distributed generation facility to the public utility’s distribution 
system is subject to fines of not more than $100 per day that 
the public utility is in violation of this section. 
 
Next, states can increase the attractiveness of third-party 
PPAs and win over the electric utility constituency by allowing 
third-party PPAs to satisfy certain utility requirements. First, 
states can allow these demand-side generators to count towards 
utilities’ energy efficiency requirements. States that have not 
enacted energy efficiency requirements should consider doing 
so, since energy efficiency is the most cost-effective way to 
manage energy demands.162 Energy efficiency decreases con-
sumers’ demand for electricity, and allows the utility to save on 
transmission and distribution costs while remaining on the 
cheaper end of the merit order scale of power sources.163 
In conjunction with these energy efficiency requirements, 
states should consider adopting a decoupling framework that 
provides utilities with a dependable revenue stream and elimi-
nates their otherwise-existing incentive to discourage energy 
efficiency in order to maximize their sales. Secondly, states can 
allow for the electric utility to count demand-side renewable 
generation facilities towards their RPSs at twice the conven-
tional rate of 1 REC per 1 megawatt-hour, providing benefits to 
both the consumer and the utility. 
 
 
 161. See S.P. 367, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013), § 4423, available 
at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=SP0367& 
item=1&snum=126. 
 162. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 26, 77; 
Energy Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78. 
 163. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 19, at 26, 77; 
Energy Efficiency As a Resource, supra note 78. 
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Section 4. Decoupling.164 Electricity revenues shall be 
fully decoupled from sales pursuant to the provisions of this 
section. 
 (a) Prior to the beginning of each fiscal year, each public 
utility shall consult with the Public Utilities Commission and 
address the following categories: 
  (i) Capital spending on utility infrastructure; 
  (ii) Operation and maintenance expenses; 
  (iii) Any other costs relating to maintaining safety 
and reliability that are mutually agreed upon by the Commis-
sion and the public utility. 
 (b) The public utility shall file a proposed plan with the 
Commission for these categories of costs for the prospective fis-
cal year within 90 days. 
 (c) The Commission shall approve the proposed plan 
within 90 days if: 
  (i) The investments and spending are found to be 
reasonably needed to maintain safe and reliable distribution 
service over the short and long term; and 
  (ii) The rates are just and reasonable. 
 (d) The Commission may modify the proposed plan as 
necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (c). 
 
Section 5. Applicability of Electricity From Solar      
Energy Distributed Generation Facilities Towards   
Energy Efficiency Standards. A public utility may count to-
wards its energy efficiency target the share of electricity that a 
host uses from a solar energy distributed generation facility or 
sells to the public utility. 
 
Section 6. Value of Renewable Energy Certificates.165 
A public utility may count electricity from a solar energy dis-
tributed generation facility at double the facility’s electrical 
output if the utility: 
 (a) Owns or has contracted for the solar energy distribut-
ed generation facility and the associated renewable energy cer-
tificates; or 
 (b) Has contracted to purchase the associated renewable 
energy certificates. 
 
 164. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.1 (2013). 
 165. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.286.040(2)(b) (2012). 
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States can also maximize the effectiveness of third-party 
PPAs by establishing state-sponsored loan programs and guid-
ing interested consumers towards the best financing methods 
available.166 State-sponsored loans will be most useful when 
they provide for repayment over long timeframes with low-
interest rates.167 By specifying appropriate financing methods, 
states can also streamline fundraising to facilitate a thriving 
financing market within this niche.168 Additionally, provisions 
supporting the use of third-party financiers can bring the fi-
nancial industry to the aid of the third-party PPA model. 
 
 Section 7. State-Sponsored Loan Program for Solar  
 Energy Distributed Generation Facilities.169 
 (a) The Commission shall establish a “Solar Energy Dis-
tributed Generation Facility Loan Fund.” Such fund shall be 
used for the purposes of making and guaranteeing loans or de-
ferred loans authorized under subsection (b) and may be used 
for expenses incurred by the Commission in the implementa-
tion of the program of loans, deferred loans and loan guaran-
tees under this section. 
 (b) The Commission may, in its discretion, make low-cost 
loans or deferred loans to a host or independent solar energy 
producer for the financing, construction, installation, or 
maintenance of a solar energy distributed generation facility. 
  (i) Any such loan for a solar energy distributed gen-
eration facility shall be no more than is necessary to promote 
deployment of such facility. 
  (ii) Any such loan or deferred loan shall have a re-
payment period of at least 10 years. 
  (iii) Any such loan or deferred loan shall be exempt 
from taxation by the State and by the counties and municipali-
ties of the State. 
 
 
 166. See CORY ET AL., supra note 60, at 2; KOLLINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 
3. 
 167. Loan Programs, supra note 98. 
 168. See Cardwell, supra note 60. 
 169. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-40a (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 
§ 8057 (2012). 
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Section 8. Outside Financing for Solar Energy Dis- 
 tributed Generation Facilities.170 
 (a) In addition to or independent from any loans made 
under section 7, a host and the independent solar energy pro-
ducer with which it contracts may also contract for third-party 
financing. 
 (b) Any host that is a state agency or municipality may 
use designated funds, bonds, lease purchase agreements, or a 
master lease, in addition to or independent from any loans 
made under section 7, provided its use is consistent with the 
purpose of the appropriation. 
 
States should also provide a fluid electricity transfer mod-
el. In such a model, consumers can buy electricity from their 
public utility when their solar energy distributed generation fa-
cility is insufficient; they can also sell surplus electricity to the 
utility when the facility is producing in excess of the consum-
er’s demand. By using a feed-in tariff to set the rate for sales to 
the public utility at a premium, states can expect to see the 
third-party PPA model be more successful.  
However, states should also be prepared to face wary elec-
tric utilities, who will be forced to spread their non-operating 
costs among the reduced pool of consumers who are without 
third-party PPAs and who continue to purchase their electricity 
from the electric utility. This can be combated by allowing utili-
ties to engage in cost shifting to return certain non-operating 
costs to consumers with third-party PPAs. 
 
Section 9. Feed-In Tariffs.171 
 (a) The Commission shall by rule establish a solar energy 
distributed generation facility feed-in tariff program in order to 
encourage the rapid and sustainable development of solar en-
ergy distributed generation facilities. 
 (b) The Commission shall establish rates to provide rev-
enue for the following purposes: 
  (i) To pay for current expenses for operating and 
maintaining the solar energy distributed generation facility; 
 
 170. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-37x(i). 
 171. See S.P. 367, 126th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013), § 4423, available 
at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp? paper=SP0367& 
item=1&snum=126. 
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  (ii) To pay the annual principal and interest due of 
loans for the construction of the solar energy distributed gener-
ation facility; 
  (iii) To make up for the avoided cost, if any, of build-
ing or purchasing additional nonrenewable generated electrici-
ty; 
  (iv) To pay for any and all other reasonable costs 
and expenses related to generating electricity by the solar en-
ergy distributed generation facility; 
  (v) To pay a minimum annual return of at least 8% 
and not less than 10% to an efficiently designed solar energy 
distributed generation facility for contracts initiated in the first 
2 years after [the date of enactment]. Thereafter, every 2 years, 
the commission may reduce the minimum annual return by 
0.5%. 
 (c) The Commission shall adopt rules by [the date of en-
actment] for the design of the rates under this section. 
 (d) The Commission shall, after notice and hearing, bi-
annually establish a solar energy factor that must be a 
nonbypassable surcharge payable by every customer of a public 
utility. The surcharge must be payable by all customer classes. 
The commission shall set the surcharge at a level sufficient to 
pay the costs of electricity purchased under subsection (b) and 
any interconnection costs under section 3(a). For the purpose of 
this section, “nonbypassable surcharge” means charges applied 
to all customer billings in a given region whether they receive 
service from a local utility or from a competitive supplier. The-
se charges include transition charges, access charges, regional 
levies and taxes. The surcharge is payable by all suppliers on a 
kilowatt-usage basis. 
 (e) The Commission shall review the rates established in 
subsection (b) by [one year after the date of enactment] and 
every 2 years thereafter and adjust those rates for new con-
tracts as necessary to account for inflation, assist in the profit-
able development of solar energy distributed generation facili-
ty, and prevent uneconomical costs to ratepayers. The 
commission may reduce the rates in subsection (b) to reflect 
any federal or state subsidies, tax credits or other incentives 
that a solar energy distributed generation facility may receive. 
 
Section 10. Cost Shifting. The Commission shall estab-
lish a mechanism so that a host pays its equitable portion of a 
public utility’s non-operating costs. Specifically, such mecha-
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nism shall require each host to pay the difference between the 
amount the utility pays to purchase the electricity from the 
host and the amount the utility would pay to acquire the same 
amount of solar via a wholesale power purchase agreement. 
 
While many states across the country have enacted certain 
aspects of these proposed solutions, there has not yet been a 
comprehensive legislative framework facilitating the success of 
the third-party PPA model. This Note provides the first sum-
mary analysis and statement of what issues states need to con-
sider to encourage the third-party PPA model, and how states 
can navigate those issues to maximize the value of this niche 
market. 
  CONCLUSION   
The modern energy industry is a dynamic marketplace 
that has developed far beyond the traditional vertically inte-
grated electric utility. Power generation has been severed from 
transmission and distribution services. Concurrently, environ-
mental concerns and a push for energy security have put a 
spotlight on renewable energy sources. Besides utility-size solar 
panel facilities, solar panel companies are also making sales to 
individual consumers through the innovative third-party power 
purchase agreement business model.  
However, this model rests on the premise that the solar 
panel company sells electricity to the consumer, much like a 
regulated electric utility. In nearly half of the states in the 
country, it remains unclear whether this is a permissible busi-
ness model. While some solar panel companies are foraying into 
these untested markets, there has not been the widespread 
market penetration that exists in states with favorable third-
party PPA policies. This has left many of these states sitting on 
the sideline while other states cash in on the renewable energy 
construction boom. Those states that remain inactive players 
can get in on the action by passing third-party power purchase 
agreement laws that legitimize and define the scope of this 
business model. In light of the fact that there is a right way and 
a wrong way to regulate business, these laws should be consci-
entiously drafted to facilitate a streamlined approach that in-
corporates energy efficiency and renewable portfolio standards 
while mitigating the potential for negative externalities that 
shift costs to innocent bystanders. If states adopt the statutory 
provisions suggested in this Note, they can foster a new area of 
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business within their state, develop responsible twenty-first 
century utility regulation, allow consumers to save on electrici-
ty, and reduce traditional air pollutant and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
